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ABSTRACT
This article examines Houellebecq’s two genomics novels, Les
Particules élémentaires and La Possibilité d’une île and elaborates
their relationship with Neo-Darwinian evolutionary naturalism and
neoliberal capitalism. In these works, the mutual interdependence
of these two regimes of thought both necessitates and makes
possible the technology of human cloning, which promises
humanity an escape from the misery of its own biological, political
predicament. Houellebecq’s work, I show, problematises this dia-
lectic, and in doing so oﬀers an incisive critique of utopian post-
humanism, providing instead only an aporetic—but rigorously
materialist—form of hope.
RÉSUMÉ
Cet article examine les deux romans génomiques de Houellebecq,
Les Particules élémentaires et La possibilité d’une île, et développe
leur rapport avec le naturalisme évolutionniste néo-darwinien et le
néolibéralisme. Dans ces romans, l’interdépendance mutuelle de
ces deux régimes de pensée nécessite et rend possible la techno-
logie du clonage humain, qui promet à l’humanité d’échapper à la
misère de sa propre situation politique et biologique. Je montre
que l’œuvre d’Houellebecq problématise cette dialectique et, ce
faisant, oﬀre une critique tranchant du posthumanisme utopique,
ne fournissant au contraire qu’une forme d’espoir aporétique—
mais rigoureusement matérialiste.
Dès lors qu’une mutation métaphysique s’est produite, elle se développe sans rencontrer de
résistance jusqu’à ses conséquences ultimes. Elle balaie sans même y prêter attention les
systèmes économiques et politiques, les jugements esthétiques, les hiérarchies sociales.
Aucune force humaine ne peut interrompre sons cours—aucune autre force que l’apparition
d’une nouvelle mutation métaphysique.’
—Michel Houellebecq, Les Particules élémentaires (1998, 10)
Someone once said that it is easier to imagine the end of the world than to imagine the end
of capitalism. We can now revise that and witness the attempt to imagine capitalism by way
of imagining the end of the world.
—Fredric Jameson, ‘Future City’ (2003, 76)
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How can replicating the human create a new species? How does repetition liberate
humanity from a biological and social system—a metaphysics—that reproduces and
determines its subjects in the same movement? Houellebecq’s two genomics novels, Les
Particules élémentaires (1998) and La Possibilité d’une île (2005a), seem to oﬀer us an
answer to these questions. In these works, genomic cloning promises humanity freedom
from the violent and deterministic reproductive relations of late capitalist society as well
as evolutionary biology: the clone is an autonomous, biosocial territory, withdrawn from
the myriad cruelties of Neo-Darwinian neoliberalism—constituting, de facto, a new
species of emancipated human. This essay seeks to scrutinise this ﬁctional solution
and to illuminate its relation to current political and biological discourses in contem-
porary Western society. Does Houellebecq’s genomic proposition for liberation oﬀer
a hopeful critique of and solution to the crisis in contemporary capitalism? Or, does such
desire for transcendent withdrawal amount to nothing other than pathetic renunciation,
and biological nihilism?
The preface to Particules frames the process of liberation through biological cloning within
a tripartite scheme of socio-historical development. This is explicitly grounded in August
Comte’s theory of social evolution, according to which humanity proceeds through three
stages of development: theological, metaphysical, and positive. One of the novel’s two
protagonists, the gifted, depressive bio-physicist, Michel Djerzinski, is the founder of a new
paradigm in genetic theory, from which is developed a genomic technology for frictionless
and eﬃcient human reproduction and the obsolescence of sexual relation and desire. This
discovery, disclosed in full in the novel’s epilogue, at the conclusion of Djerzinski’s tortured life,
is understood as ushering in the ﬁnal or ‘positive’ stage in the development of society. This is
what the novel’s narrator calls the third and most radical ‘mutation métaphysique’ in human
history: ‘les transformations radicales et globales de la vision du monde adoptée par le plus
grand nombre’ [‘a radical, global transformation in the values towhich themajority [of people]
subscribe’] (Houellebecq 1998, 9, 2001, 4). Humanity is released from its previous socio-
historical constraints—‘materialism’, the metaphysical stage (itself the successor to the theo-
logical stage of Christianity), which is characterised by the pervasion of biological determin-
ism, the agony of sexual longing, the aﬀective desert of consumer capitalism, social anxiety,
and the empty surrender brought about by the foreknowledge of death. Through the inﬁnite
self-repetition of genetic cloning, humanity in the twenty-ﬁrst century transcends this, reach-
ing ecstatic being via an immortal state of total biological, social, and existential stasis.
Houellebecq’s later novel, Possibilité, can be read as a companion to Particules—or
perhaps its clone. Partly narrated from the perspective of two ‘neohuman’ replicants,
Daniel24, and later Daniel25, it explores in further detail the positive stage of which
the earlier novel oﬀers a sketch. The neohumans in this novel transcend the agonies
of the materialist world, devoid of desire, sexual or otherwise; each clone lives in an
individual, self-sustaining walled compound, drawing nutrition autotrophically from
minerals present in the atmosphere, reproducing itself through a centralised indus-
trial cloning system that delivers a new neohuman iteration immediately upon the
death of its predecessor. In the earlier work, the materialist stage is framed by
a prefatory theoretical description of the positive stage and its epilogic narrative
realisation. The later novel’s structure oscillates between the autobiographical narra-
tives of Daniel24 and Daniel25 and their originary predecessor from the twenty-ﬁrst
century, Daniel1. In the earlier work, neohuman existence is characterised by inﬁnite
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and uninterrupted tranquillity. Daniel1, a caustic satirical comedian, who like
Djerzinski is one of the key instigators in the metaphysical mutation towards neo-
humanity, is also throughout his life marked by self-lacerating depression, unfulﬁlled
sexual hunger, and existential pain.
Each novel, then, juxtaposes two distinct stages of human evolution and in its formal
rhetoric dramatises the shift from one to the next: the despair of the metaphysical or
materialist stage in the late-twentieth and early twenty-ﬁrst centuries to the comparative
bliss of a neohuman future. In both novels, metaphysical liberation of humanity from
materialism—or the transition from the metaphysical to the ﬁnal positive stage—is
catalysed not by evolutionary change, but by recurrence, the intensiﬁcation of the con-
ditions of the materialist stage and, speciﬁcally, the possibility of biological repetition
through techno-scientiﬁc progress in evolutionary genetics. As Djerzinski’s colleague,
Walcott, observes, materialism does not necessarily develop a higher form of human
existence, but is in fact ‘incompatible avec l’humanisme, et devait ﬁnir par le détruire’
[‘antithetical to humanism and would eventually destroy it’]. Although he does not live to
see his prediction called into question by the development through materialist conditions
of a neohuman state of transcendence, Walcott’s cynicism will prove to be well-founded.
For the ﬁnal stage of this process of evolution is not a higher form of existence founded on
humanist principles, but the logical conclusion of all evolution: the replacement of
humanity through the creation of a new, post-human species (1998, 373, 2001, 359).
I wish to analyse how Houellebecq’s cloning stories dramatise this dialectic, revealing
in the ‘materialist’ stage of life an insidious coalition between capitalist hegemony and
evolutionary science. Speciﬁcally, I shall be examining how in these two works human
relations are permeated by a vulgar Darwinism, wherein brutal competition for survival,
heedless individualism, and biological determinism pervade human life. This is matched,
indeed intensiﬁed, in these novels by the advent of what Fredric Jameson calls ‘late
capitalism’, a globally pervasive, state-enforced, mediatised, self-reproducing cultural
logic of free-market competition, automation, and individualism—as well as the exten-
sion of that logic into all forms of human relation, whether aﬀective, interpersonal, or
libidinal, as well as economic and political (Jameson, 1991, vii-xxii). Houellebecq’s clones,
I shall be arguing, are a bio-technological response to what Houellebecq calls the
materialist ‘market society’, where ‘the entirety of human relations [. . .] are mediated
via a simple numerical calculation entailing attractiveness, novelty, and value for
money’—the product of what Carole Sweeney in her analysis of Houellebecq’s work
calls the ‘encroachment of capitalism in its neoliberal biopolitical form’ (Harraway 1991,
43; Sweeney 2013, ix). The relation of Houellebecq’s work to what might be called late
capitalism, neoliberalism, capitalist governmentality, or the subjectiﬁcation of the homo
economicus has been well documented and acutely analysed (Best and Crowley 2007;
Crowley 2012; Sweeney 2013). Likewise, numerous critics have identiﬁed and explored
Houellebecq’s preoccupation with biological discourses and scientiﬁc reductionism
(McCann 2010; Morrey 2013; Rabosseau 2010; Woollenn 2013). In what follows, there-
fore, I seek to develop an account of how in the ﬁgure of the human clone these two
streams of thought are knotted in Houellebecq’s two novels. In doing so, I aim to
demonstrate Houellebecq’s complexity as an interlocutor in contemporary debates
around genomics and posthuman futurity.
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Houellebecq’s clones critique biological nihilism and political despair but also pro-
blematise naïve optimism. As such, these works provide us with a more ambivalent and
rigorous conception of social and biological materialism than the schematic quasi-
Comtean account of human evolution discussed earlier.
Neo-Darwinism; neo-naturalism
In a recent critique of contemporary sociobiology and genomics, Hilary and Steven Rose
note how widespread is the language and logic of genetic and evolutionary determin-
ism (Rose & Rose, 2012). Everywhere one cares to look, they argue, ‘metaphors of DNA,
hard-wiring, Darwinian natural selection and evolution [are] invoked by the media or
politicians’ (2012, 277). Furthermore, symptomatic of Darwinism’s and genetics’ discur-
sive universality, a ‘deference to the determining authority of the life sciences’ has crept
into humanist disciplines—which, if not antithetical to evolutionary accounts of the
human condition, usually seek to avoid the empiricism and reduction necessary to
natural sciences (278). ‘[P]hilosophy, art, ethics, sociology, politics, and law’ are expected
at the very least to articulate their relation, whether positive or negative, to evolutionary
biology and its implicitly essentialist epistemology (278). Often, that relation is one of
uncritical acceptance; genes are claimed to be responsible for, among other things, male
violence, female coyness, voting intentions, the nature of art, and, tellingly, the ‘inevit-
ability of a neoliberal economy’ (22).
The formal imperialism of this Darwinian thinking extends to its conceptual content,
which aﬃrms the supremacy of evolutionary utility, proﬁt, and competition over all
human existence and agency. Unlike Comte’s notion of human development, Darwin’s
theory of ‘the struggle to survive’ is non-teleological, driven not by an additive dynamic
of emancipatory progress, but by elimination. For the biologist and theorist Stanley
Shostak, this means biological science has a decisively simple, but brutal, conceptual
lodestone: ‘Natural selection is ordinarily supposed to power evolution by sifting varia-
tions in life’s forms through an environment ﬁlter. The ﬁltrate evolves; the sediment
expires’ (Shostak 1999, 231). Daniel Dennett takes this further, asserting the transcen-
dence of this law, conceiving of natural selection as a ‘universal acid’; an idea ‘capable of
cutting right to the heart of everything in sight’, whose logic exceeds mere biological
phenomena but encompasses ‘the universe as a whole, from gas to genius’ (Dennett
1996, 521; Midgley 2000, 73). In this way, evolutionary determinism becomes
a cosmology. The human species has no historical purpose or direction, but is driven
at the level of its fundamental biological being to struggle, a concept which itself
remains untouched by the constant ﬂux of actual living matter.
It is also in this way, to return to Rose and Rose’s original thesis, that Neo-Darwinian
evolutionary thinking nourishes and is, in turn, nourished by the hegemony of contem-
porary, or in their terms, neoliberal, capitalism. Although new forms of Darwinian
thinking in psychology, economics, philosophy, and elsewhere are marked by their
incorporation of techno-scientiﬁc advances in genomics and neurology, the touchstone
for Neo-Darwinian explanations of the complexity of human life is an almost Hobbesian
notion of bellum omnes contra omnium. The ‘evolutionary synthesis’ of Darwinism and
genetics can be dated to the 1960s, as an answer to the empirical and conceptual
lacunae in traditional Darwinian evolution, which could not yet fully account for the
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reproduction of certain biological traits (Bowler 1989, 312–314). Trace further back,
however, and it becomes clear that Neo-Darwinism is less a new synthesis, but
a continuation of the close conceptual reliance of evolutionary Darwinism on free-
market capitalism. As Darwin concedes in the Origin of Species, natural selection’s
conception of constant competition for survival owes a debt of inﬂuence to the ‘doctrine
of Malthus’, setting resource scarcity against population growth and predicting constant
struggle (Darwin 1859, 5). Marx’s initial enthusiasm for Darwin’s biological-historical
materialism is replaced by ideological suspicion: ‘It is remarkable how Darwin recognises
among beasts and plants his English society with its division of labour, competition,
opening-up of new markets, “inventions”’ (1965, 128). Later in the century, Herbert
Spencer’s coining of the phrase ‘the survival of the ﬁttest’ provided evolutionist capitalist
thinkers and Spencer himself with post facto biological authorisation for the notion of
a divine and eﬃcient market (which ironically, as Marx points out, was already dominant
in English society) (Hawkins 1997, 89–90).
Today, the kinship between what Shostak critically designates ‘ordinary’ or institu-
tional biology’s account of evolution and the ideology of free-market competition is not
disavowed but explicit. Richard Dawkins has made famous the theory of the ‘selﬁsh
gene’, the notion that we are mere ﬂeshly vessels determined by an infrahuman struggle
to survive (Dawkins 1989). The biologist E.O. Wilson argues that the heterogeneous gene
pool of pre-modern civilisation was a ‘free market of genetic diversity’, suggesting that
whatever human genetic ‘market’ exists today does so as a set of competitive circum-
stances beyond our control (Wilson 1998, 299). Similarly, ‘free trade, the rule of law, and
sound market practices’ provide stability in contemporary society; while further ‘govern-
ment subsidy in the free-market economy’ can solve the Malthusian problem of popula-
tion growth (Wilson, 316–318). Wilson posits that the answer to the inherent problems
of biological struggle is the enforcement of economic competition—eroding the diﬀer-
ence between the two, while at the same time raising the possibility that what Michel
Foucault calls in his lectures on biopolitics ‘pure competition’ is not natural but
a historically speciﬁc form of governance (Foucault and Senellart 2008, 120–121).
Either way, as a spontaneously arising phenomenon as well as a mode of economic
organisation that requires enforcement, the struggle to survive is understood here as
biopolitical rationality.
Houellebecq’s work, as several critics have argued, describes a world almost entirely
determined by such logic. Houellebecq’s ﬁction, John McCann says, ‘takes place in
a Darwinian world’, where, echoing Marx’s reading of Darwin, human progress is not
characterised by melioration, but by the centrality of a struggle which ‘eliminates those
who do not ﬁt into the circumstances’ (McCann 2010, 8). In Possibilité, this dynamic
reaches a grotesque conclusion: during a particularly severe (probably anthropogenic)
heat wave in France, thousands of elderly people—deemed valueless—die in conditions
similar to concentration camps as a result of wilful neglect. For Douglas Morrey, such
a collapse in care for others is partly a function of the extension of capitalist rationality to
libidinal or aﬀective relations; Daniel1 experiences the process of ageing as a gradual
decrease in sexual value and, thus in his value overall. For Morrey, however, this
originates also in the notion of a ‘deep atavistic heritage that serves to underline
these aspects of human behaviour as so many evolutionary facts’ (Morrey 2013, 131).
Geoﬀ Woollen points out that for English readers Houellebecq’s evident concern with
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evolution and Darwinism is masked by the translation of Extension du domaine de la lutte
(literally, The Extension of the Area of Struggle) as Whatever (Woollenn 2013); but the
ambivalence of the term ‘lutte’ and its translation illustrates that ‘struggle’ for
Houellebecq is neither entirely biological or sociopolitical, but determined by the two
together. Houellebecq, these critics show, grants evolutionary thought the signiﬁcance
of having ethical and social implications. Underlying this is a sense of the pervasion of
the brutality of evolutionary Darwinism in contemporary life—both at the level of
discourse, which in Woollen’s example is disavowed by the act of translation, as well
as at the level of daily economic, social, and sexual experience.
Both Woollen and Sandrine Rabosseau note the similarity of Houellebecq’s use of
biological naturalism to that of Émile Zola. The latter gives this identiﬁcation fuller
critical treatment, arguing that Houellebecq is the proponent, in her terms, of
a literary ‘neo-naturalism’ which functions to extend the socio-biological, hereditary
preoccupations of the literary Naturalist tradition into the twenty-ﬁrst century, simulta-
neously oﬀering a postmodern pastiche of the Zolian novel (Rabosseau, 106). This
comparison with Zola is instructive. David Baguley has shown that Zola was not
a detailed reader of Darwin, drawing his scientiﬁc sources instead from French evolu-
tionists, sociologists, and physiologists (Baguley 2011, 2014). Zola, however, does
respond in novels such as Germinal and La Debâcle—to a popular abstraction of
Darwinism found in bowdlerisations, translations, and tendentious interpretations of
Darwin. In other words, Zola does not essay an ‘experimental novel’ informed by
Darwinian science, but responds instead to what Paul Lafargue called ‘the drawbacks
of [Darwin’s] popularity’; to the implications of Darwinism entering popular discourse
and consciousness as a scientiﬁc theory of social and political struggle (Lafargue 1890).
Zola indicated in his Ébauches that La Debâcle sought to call forth the grand idea of
Darwinian evolution dominating the comparatively insigniﬁcant human individual
(Baguley 2014, 419). At the same time, the novel satirises the mode of transmission by
which such a theory could become simpliﬁed and dangerously political: young enthu-
siasts of the Franco-Prussian war derive their faith in conﬂict from fashionable but
nakedly ideological accounts of evolution (Zola, 1892, 28). Similarly, the protagonist of
Germinal encourages a disastrous general strike, causing widespread death and destruc-
tion, based on a Darwinian conception of Marxist historical determinism picked up from
cheap, ten-sous pamphlets (Zola 1978; Sreenan 2014). Houellebecq’s treatment of
Darwin is analogous to that of Zola. He is not evidently a sophisticated interpreter of
the nuances of Darwinian theory, but insightful in exactly the opposite way. Martin
Crowley has argued that Houellebecq oﬀers us a minimal kind of critical ‘derisory
lucidity’ in his work being itself a degraded conduit of a degraded time. Houellebecq’s
‘Darwinian universe’, his dramatisation of biological struggle and, as I shall show, his
adoption of a Neo-Darwinian vernacular enacts and satirises the debased Darwinian
cosmology of our time (Crowley 2012, 149). The Darwinian theorists I have mentioned,
Dennett, Dawkins, Wilson, are popularisers as much as Darwinian biologists, and
Houellebecq’s Neo-Naturalism responds to this vulgar or popular conception of
Darwin, just as Zola did, with vulgarity. The question remains as to whether this insight
or lucidity oﬀers more than Zola’s implicitly critical commentary, or even ‘a small cry of
protest’, against a biopolitical rationality that has transcended popularity and become
immanent to the textures of human relation.
6 N. SREENAN
Houellebecq’s bio-capitalist realism
It is via the hegemonic victory of capitalism in the twentieth and twenty-ﬁrst centuries
that Darwin’s ‘dangerous idea’ comes to transcend its broad popularity in the nineteenth
century, to dominate humanistic discourses (Rose & Rose) and then, as I suggest, to
become immanent to social, sexual, aﬀective, and political relations. For Jason Moore,
humanity has since the ﬁfteenth century been living in the ‘Capitalocene’, a geo-
historical period in which nature itself—climate, ecology, physical geography—is re-
organised around humanity’s endless pursuit of proﬁt (Moore 2015, 172–173). Following
Marx, therefore, the advent of Darwinian natural selection in the mid-nineteenth century
supports in biological terms the ideology of free market competition, but also the idea
that this ideology is inscribed at the foundational levels of our material, biological
existence as humans. This redoubles the sense of Darwinism’s pervasion in political
social reality, an ecological version of what Mark Fisher, adapting Jameson’s work on
postmodernity and the logic of late capitalism, calls Capitalist Realism (Fisher 2009). Life
under neoliberalism, Fisher writes, is poisoned by the ‘widespread sense that not only is
capitalism the only viable political and economic system, but also that it is now
impossible even to imagine—let alone construct—a coherent alternative to it (2009,
2). Popular culture especially, Fisher demonstrates, has renounced imagining the new
and is content instead to live within the comfort of a boundless present, and to oﬀer
entertainment through a combination of apocalyptic fantasy and nostalgia. Such
a diagnosis, as we shall see, is crucial to understanding Houellebecq’s pre-occupation
with evolution.
For David Harvey, neoliberalism enforces such superstructural nihilism with deliberate
economic policy: the state provides a guarantee of so called competitive ‘free markets’
through the privatisation of public wealth, the creation of markets in public services, and
minimising state intervention (2005, 2). The paradoxical enforcement of market freedom,
Wendy Brown argues, epitomises the neoliberal mobilisation of law not to repress or
punish, but to structure competition and eﬀect ‘the conduct of conduct’ (2015, 148).
Neoliberalism, Brown asserts, has transcended economic logic and ideology to become
an entire ‘political rationality’, through which the horizons of human imagination and
representation—and therefore the horizons of human agency—are bound by a set of
explicit and implicit regulations hostile to alternative ways of conceiving human rela-
tions. Neo-Darwinian and genomic discourse tighten neoliberal capitalism’s stranglehold
on the imaginative, political, existential limits of human society. It is not only the case
that evolutionary biology and genomics are dependent on proﬁt as institutionally viable
practices. These discourses claim an exhaustive vision of reality, through which they
reinforce the sense of capitalism’s total capture of human life that Fisher, Harvey, and
Brown seek to analyse in cultural, economic, and political contexts. Fisher’s work may be
the least rigorous of these three thinkers, but it does furnish us with the most useful
phrase. Capitalist realism in its Neo-Darwinian guise creates the conditions within which
it is not merely impossible to imagine a world outside capitalism but beyond the
capacity of our biological evolution. This even goes beyond Moore’s geological concept,
since his diagnosis in its substitution of ‘capital’ for human in the term ‘Anthropocene’
diﬀerentiates humanity from capitalism as such, suggesting the possibility of the former
moving beyond the latter. Capitalist realism nourishes the claim that such utopian
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thought is contrary to fundamental biological and genetic possibility. Capitalist reality
and evolutionary biological reality become mutually reassuring metonyms—describing
the same restlessly shifting but fundamentally invariable world.
Houellebecq’s Particules and Possibilité are generically science ﬁctional, but respond
to the current neoliberal biopolitical juncture with a literary rendering of ‘capitalist
realism’ which I have previously called, after Rabosseau, Neo-Naturalism. The earlier
work oﬀers a cultural history of the advent of neoliberalism in Europe and France,
embodied in the ‘Lieu de Changement’, a ﬁctional proxy for the ‘L’espace du possible’
holiday settlement in Meschers-sur-Gironde. Founded by a group of soixante-huitards in
the mid-seventies, the original purpose of Houellebecq’s ‘Lieu de Changement’ was to
oﬀer people the opportunity to enact utopian ideals in the ‘ici et maintenant’ as
opposed to the ‘nowhere’ implicit in utopian theory (1998, 122). To that end, the Lieu
was created as a zone of autonomy from everyday life, within which like-minded people
could live in the Summer months joyfully practicing democratic principles and, in its
founders’ terms, ‘baiser un bon coup’ [‘get your rocks oﬀ’] (Houellebecq 1998, 98, 2001,
114). By the 1980s, this spatio-temporally partial and fundamentally hedonistic utopia
ﬁnds itself incorporated by the very capitalist hegemony from which it sought to with-
draw. In order to counteract ﬁnancial losses caused by its aging clientele and facilities, as
well as cultural aversion to the outdated anarchism upon which it was founded,
a typically neoliberal solution is put forth: ‘Une brève lutte de pouvoir interne eut lieu,
et l’association loi 1901 qui gérait l’endroit fut dissolute pour être remplacée par une
SARL’ [‘After a brief internal power struggle, the Lieu ceased to be an association under
the act of 1901 and became a publicly traded corporation’] (1998, 127, 2001, 120).
A number of years later, the Lieu was oﬀering residential courses to businesses in Zen
meditation, communication, Gestalt therapy, and other skills, and had an estimable list
of corporate clients: ‘BNP, IBM, ministère du Budget, RATP, Bouygues. . .’ (128; 120). By
the time Djerzinski’s sexually monomaniacal half-brother, Bruno, visits, the Lieu has
entirely transformed. It has become a kind of New Age, bourgeois ﬂesh market where
sex is a commodity competed for by its visitors. It has also become an explicitly capitalist
venture, whose former utopian beginnings are present only as traces—a Bakuninian
slogan on the camp gates, signs exhorting mutual respect—and are maintained princi-
pally for the purposes of monetisable nostalgia.
Here, capital destroys its opposition not through force but by the paradoxical
imposition of further freedom: it co-opts the ideals and aesthetic of revolution and
sells them back to a society it has already rendered incapable of imagining meaningful
forms of political resistance. The visitors to the Lieu exist in a state of pure present, in
perpetual competition for sexual gratiﬁcation, relishing the camp’s nostalgic atmo-
sphere. They no longer function, even temporarily, outside the grasp of capital, but
have interiorised its fundamental principles. This process of political submission echoes
Fisher’s and Brown’s analyses of neoliberal inﬂuence, and traces the historical arc of
Harvey’s account of neoliberalism in the West: a process beginning in the 70s in
response to rising inﬂation, made possible by ﬁnancial deregulation at the start of
that decade, and becoming sealed in the 1980s with the ascendance of Ronald
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher (Harvey 2005, 9). This development seems even to
envelop parliamentary forms of socialist resistance as well as cultural modes of micro-
political action. ‘Les années Mitterrand’ were marked by the sudden retrenchment in
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1983 of austerity-based economic policy in response to global inﬂation (Lordon 2001).
They were also a time, in Houellebecq’s ﬁctional France, when Djerzinski and his peers in
genetic science beneﬁted from the neoliberalisation of genomics, with venture capital
supporting the foundation of companies designed to exploit commercially the potential
if its new discoveries. Neo-evolutionary science, therefore, beneﬁts from the privatisation
of scientiﬁc funding, while this mode of political-economic organisation is ratiﬁed as
natural and timeless in the epistemology and conceptual content of the new biology.
Houellebecq makes explicit the implications of this entanglement of capital and
evolutionary biology for conceptions of human nature. The sexual economy of the
Lieu, as well as its consumerist ideological substrate, is understood by its chief executive
to have its roots in the atavistic, biologically rooted drives of human nature. At the same
time, while the ‘sexual revolution’ of the 1960s embodied by the Lieu appears to eﬀace
traditional forms of courtship, this same chief executive asserts the fundamentally
bourgeois concept of les soirées dansantes as the inevitable mode of sexual selection.
Such conservative ritual, he argues, is a fundamentally unchanging trait of all human
societies which, in primitive times, used feasts and dances to seek collective ecstasy.
Vague notions of biologically determined ‘human nature’, therefore, are deployed not
only to justify the free market model of political economy, but to extend that model to
sexual and social reproduction.
The role that capital plays in naturalising its exploitation of desire is made explicit in
Possibilité in a conversation between Daniel1 and his ﬁrst wife, Isabelle, a teen-magazine
editor. The latter argues that sexual success in the marketplace of ﬂesh originates in an
instinctual will to power, while economic success rests upon its acknowledgement and
exploitation.
Si les ﬁlles sont attirées sexuellement par les types qui montent sur scène, poursuivit-elle, ce
n’est pas uniquement qu’elles recherchent la célébrité; c’est aussi qu’elles sentent qu’un
individu qui monte sur scène risque sa peau, parce que le public est un gros animal
dangereux, et qu’il peut à tout instant anéantir sa créature, la chasser, l’obliger à s’enfuir
sous la honte et les quolibets. La récompense qu’elles peuvent oﬀrir au type qui risque sa
peau en montant sur scène, c’est leur corps; c’est exactement la même chose qu’avec un
gladiateur, ou un torero. Il serait stupide de s’imaginer que ces mécanismes primitifs ont
disparu: je les connais, je les utilise, je gagne ma vie avec. (Houellebecq 2005a, 34)
[If girls are sexually attracted to guys who get up on stage [. . .] it’s not simply that they are
seeking fame; it’s also that they feel an individual who gets up on stage risks his neck,
because the public is a big dangerous animal that can annihilate its creation, hunt it down,
and force it to ﬂee, booed oﬀ in shame. The reward these girls can oﬀer to the guy who risks
his neck by going on stage is their body; it’s exactly the same thing with a gladiator, or
a matador. It would be stupid to imagine that these primitive mechanisms have disap-
peared; I know them, I use them, I earn my living from them.] (Houellebecq 2005b, 25)
Just as the chief executive of the Lieu draws on the scientiﬁc authority of evolutionary
thought for his assertion that bourgeois forms of sexual courtship and competition are
rooted in essential human nature, and in turn to exploit that, Isabelle does the same
with an essentialist narrative of atavistic female sexual desire for male power. Their
conceptions of human sexual desire are obviously reductive; but they are also, despite
their scientiﬁc pretension, ahistorical and anti-materialist, positing desire as immune to
economic and social situation and their interface with gendered power relations. And
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yet, the success of their respective businesses conﬁrms empirically for them the scientiﬁc
realism of their theses, just as their misanthropic notions of human nature authorise an
amoral, pragmatically realist approach to economic exploitation. Houellebecq’s staging
and critical illumination of the neoliberal logic of the re-invented Lieu and teenage
magazines rests on the mutual reinforcement of the respective realisms of capitalism
and neo-evolutionary biological essentialism.
Surviving the struggle to survive
Houellebecq’s works are not content with diagnosing the epistemological enmeshing of
neoliberal capitalism and evolutionary essentialism. Rather, they clarify its ramiﬁcations
and articulate how it is experienced, often in the form of emblematic popular culture
ephemera and artworks; sometimes—as in the case of the Lieu—drawn from real-life
examples; at others invented by Houellebecq himself. One striking iteration of the latter
is one of Daniel1’s violent, satirical television programmes that stages an encounter
between a Palestinian ‘terroriste du Hamas’ and a German tourist on the question of the
value of human life, as they brutally torture a hostage (2005a, 48). As the Hamas
member commits a series of pitiless acts of violence on his hostage, another terrorist
intervenes and a brief discussion ensues in vaguely Darwinian terms. As they castrate
him, the two terrorists conclude that, from a purely Darwinian perspective, the biological
value of the hostage had changed, while his economic value remained high. On the one
hand, we can read this parable as a darkly comic critique of the conﬂation in neoliber-
alism of economic and biological notions of value. On the other hand, the notion of
a biological struggle is transposed into a political one—between Hamas and its oppo-
nents—and thereby constructed as a natural, evolutionary existential battle rather than
a historically contingent political war. The overriding eﬀect of this exchange, however, is
that of repulsion. Houellebecq employs the violent aesthetic of literary Naturalism to
delineate in painstaking detail the eﬀects of this warfare: the terrorist ﬁrst tears out the
hostage’s teeth, proceeds to do the same to his ﬁngernails, and completes the torture by
rending the hostage’s testicles. Although it is couched in biological, Darwinian logic, the
partly disavowed political economic context of this brutality is key. Limiting conceptions
of human value to either a purely biological, economic, or biological-economic logic
reduces human society to a kind of barbarous realism, from which our self-imposed
epistemological constraints allow us no escape.
Particules oﬀers a similar vision of endemic and inescapable social Darwinian sava-
gery. The ur-narrative of Darwin’s struggle to survive saturates the novel, ﬁrst appearing
in detail in the ﬁctional—but recognisable—television programme, ‘La Vie des animaux’.
Bruno watches this as a child with a mixture of awe and trepidation:
Les gazelles et les daims, mammifères graciles, passaient leurs journées dans la terreur. Les
lions et les panthères vivaient dans un abrutissement apathique traversé de brèves explo-
sions de cruauté. Ils tuaient, déchiquetaient, ils dévoraient les animaux les plus faibles,
vieillis ou malades; puis ils replongeaient dans un sommeil stupide, uniquement animé par
les attaques de parasites qui les dévoraient de l’intérieur. (Houellebecq 1998, 47)
[Graceful animals like gazelles and antelopes spent their days in abject terror while lions
and panthers lived out their lives in listless imbecility punctuated by explosive bursts of
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cruelty. They slaughtered weaker animals, dismembered and devoured the sick and the
old before falling back into a brutish sleep where the only activity was that of the
parasites feeding on them from within.] (Houellebecq 2001, 38)
Houellebecq’s choice of television, here and in Possibilité, as the medium with which to
stage simplistic but aﬀecting parables of Darwinian cruelty is noteworthy. This rote
description of La Vie des animaux can be read as an allegory for the pitiless, mechanically
eliminative milieu within which Houellebecq’s novels take place; while the cartoonishly
violent torture scene above is a metaphor for a society which conducts its wars on the
basis of Darwinian and economic conceptions of human value. Conﬁned to a psychiatric
hospital in later life, Bruno writes a ﬁlm script set in a utopian future in which La Vie des
animaux exists only as testimony to ‘de la barbarie des époques antérieures’ [‘the barbarity
of previous eras’] (2005a, 322; 2001, 310). Like Zola’s pamphlets, that these narratives are
transmitted through a popular medium is important, since television—a totem for a fully
mediatised neoliberal society—allows those narratives to assume an unquestioned and
universal position of dominance in a wider ideological superstructure. The human animal
lives in a society no diﬀerent to that of the gazelle, or the lion, or the parasites that feed
upon them; the question is whether you will be a predator or a victim.
If we read Lieu de Changement as a synecdoche for Western society at large, and the
sexual economy within as a corollary of the hegemony of a crudely Darwinian, biologically
essentialist Weltanschauung, Bruno’s boarding school—another notionally autonomous
space—can also be said to represent society (and, therefore, nature) in this way. Here,
again, hierarchy, competition, and suﬀering are understood in facile biosocial terms:
Les sociétés animales fonctionnent pratiquement toutes sur un système de dominance lié à
la force relative de leurs membres. Ce système se caractérise par une hiérarchie stricte:
le mâle le plus fort du groupe est appelé animal alpha; celui-ci est suivi du second en force,
animal bêta, et ainsi de suite jusqu’à l’animal le moins élevé dans la hiérarchie, appelé
animal oméga. Les positions hiérarchiques sont généralement déterminées par des rituels
de combat; les animaux de rang bas tentent d’améliorer leur statut en provoquant les
animaux de rang plus élevé, sachant qu’en cas de victoire ils amélioreront leur position. Un
rang élevé s’accompagne de certains privilèges: se nourrir en premier, copuler avec les
femelles du groupe. Cependant, l’animal le plus faible est en général en mesure d’éviter le
combat par l’adoption d’une posture de soumission (accroupissement, présentation de
l’anus). (Houellebecq 1998, 98)
[For the most part, animal societies are structured according to a hierarchy in which rank
relates directly to the physical strength of each member. The most dominant male in the
group is known as the alpha male, his nearest rival the beta male, and so on down to the
weakest of the group, the omega male. Combat rituals generally determine status within
the group; weaker animals try to better their position by challenging those above them.
A dominant position confers certain privileges: ﬁrst to feed and to couple with females
in the group. The weakest animal, however, can generally avoid combat by adopting
such submissive postures as crouching or presenting the rump.] (Houellebecq 2001, 51)
The biologisation of the power relations between children in a boarding school not
only mirrors Isabelle’s thesis in Possibilité on the nature of female sexual desire, but also
the power dynamic of the animal kingdom in Bruno’s childhood television programme.
In this ‘primitive’ milieu Bruno’s position of weakness is anticipated and conﬁrmed by
the popular culture he consumes, and in accordance with the necessary power relations
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of natural selection he is violently abused, both physically and sexually. Houellebecq, of
course, spares us no detail in describing the abuse: Bruno is beaten, urinated upon,
sexually assaulted, and threatened with a razor blade to his genitals. His humiliation and
suﬀering, it is implied, derives from his failure in a competitive Darwinian milieu—
inscribed and mutually reinforced at the levels of culture, society, and nature—from
which there is no escape.
Competition, the struggle to survive, what Daniel1 designates the ‘théses darwiniennes
les plus élémentaires’ [‘the most elementary Darwinian arguments’], saturates human
relation in these novels, its essentialist, instrumental, and violent logic interceding itself
in economic, social, sexual, political, and economic modes of acting and understanding
action (Houellebecq 2005a, 110). It is a literary synthesis of what Rose and Rose identify in
their analysis of contemporary everyday discourse. The evolutionary story of the ‘survival
of the ﬁttest’—mediated by an already crudely Darwinian neoliberal ideology—has
become immanent to the very texture of contemporary life. Popular culture, television,
magazines, the locus of shared narratives in late capitalism reﬂects this, as does
Houellebecq’s own obscene rendering of its eﬀects, disallowing readers distance from
either the pervasion of the logic of struggle or from our complicity in it as avid consumers
of its cultural forms. This is a thoroughgoing, modiﬁed iteration of Fishers’ capitalist
realism. Whatever critical incision we might gain in relation to humanity’s entrapment in
an epistemologically reinforced biopolitical regime of barbarism, its potential is dulled by
these novels’ further clariﬁcation that we are ourselves complicit in its continuation.
Evolving out of evolution
Houellebecq’s insistent thematisation of Darwin’s ‘universal acid’ both stages and enacts the
manner in which politics, economics, and desire have in the age of universal neoliberal
rationality become saturated by the logic of biological warfare. But the subject and formal
rhetoric of his clone novels suggest that the possibility of a qualitative break from this
metaphysical condition lies precisely in the same materialism that condemns us to barbar-
ism and suﬀering. In both novels the capitalist, Darwinian realist narrative perspective of the
present is breached by narratives from another temporal and epistemic point of view: the
post- or neohuman perspective of the clone.
In Particules, this is accomplished by the epilogue and prologue, from where and
when it is understood the novel’s narrator is derived. As well as oﬀering us the narratives
of Djerzinski and Bruno, this unnamed voice provides us with distance, a panoramic
vision of the development of auto-reproductive genomic technology developed by
a scientist named Hubczejak which Djerzinski’s theoretical work has made possible.
The narrator describes how, through a marketing campaign exploiting New Age rhetoric
and the widespread desire to escape ‘tortured, contradictory, individualistic, quarrel-
some’ materialism of the twenty-ﬁrst century, popular political consent is established for
the notion that humanity itself ‘must disappear and give way to a new species which
was asexual and immortal, a species which had outgrown individuality, separation and
evolution.’ (Houellebecq 2001, 379)
There are two paradoxes here: that humanity must harness the powers of evolution-
ary development and commerce to save itself from the barbarism of evolution and
capitalism, and that doing so precipitates the end of the human as a species. The
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dialectical movement of the former, evolving beyond the constraints of evolution, is not
limited merely to the possibilities of new forms of genetic development made possible
by commercially driven scientiﬁc research. It is also widespread epistemological defer-
ence to capitalist and scientiﬁc realism which makes escaping this thinkable. Speaking of
the New Age vanguard of neohumanity, the narrator observes:
Comme tous les autresmembres de la société, ils pensaient au fondd’eux-mêmesque la solution à
tout problème—y compris aux problèmes psychologiques, sociologiques ou plus généralement
humains—ne pouvait être qu’une solution d’ordre technique. (Houellebecq 1998, 385)
[Like others in society they truly believed only in science; science was to them the arbiter
of unique, irrefutable truth. Like others in society, they believed in their hearts that the
solution to every problem—whether psychological, sociological or more broadly human—
could only be a technical solution.] (Houellebecq 2001, 377)
Thus, when Hubczejak successfully synthesises an auto-reproductive human immune
to the agony of sexual desire, to the competitive impetus of both capitalism and evolution,
and thereby to the existential pain of life, this techno-scientiﬁc solution is widely
embraced. Fifty years later, the narrator observes, the old human species is in terminal
decline and has largely been replaced by the neohuman era. ‘The forces of egotism,
cruelty and anger’ that characterised the materialist era have been transcended and
replaced by a new world order that is deﬁned by pure serenity and joy. In other words,
the Neo-Darwinian, neoliberal age of materialism is its own gravedigger, supplying its
subjects with conceptual and technological means—as well as the urgent desire—with
which to transcend it.
This is an optimistic reading of Particules, not unlike the enthusiastic technophilia
proﬀered by contemporary advocates of transhumanism and genomic progress.
Houellebecq’s vision of a techno-scientiﬁcally driven post-human solution to the pedes-
trian agonies of the human condition is notably similar to Ray Kurzweil’s notion of ‘The
Singularity’ in which he projects continuous, exponential technological progress and the
development of highly sophisticated ‘information-based technologies’, which will
‘encompass all human knowledge and proﬁciency’ (Kurzweil 2006, 8). This, Kurzweil
argues, will enable humanity not only to exceed the ‘myriad of failure modes’ and
‘cumbersome maintenance rituals’ of biologicity, but also to reach a state of intellectual
transcendence beyond the ‘derivative, petty, and circumscribed’ nature of normal
human thought (2006, 8). The futurist, Nick Bostrom, proposes an analogous but
politically inﬂected resolution. To reach a state of ‘perpetual peace’, Bostrom theorises
the necessity of a ‘singleton’, a ‘global regime that could enforce basic laws for its
members’, shaping the trajectory of human evolution through surveillance, taxation, and
positive eugenics, to ensure the stability and ﬂourishing of the human species and its
civilisation (Bostrom 2004). Further knowledge of our genetic origins, E.O. Wilson argues,
makes possible ‘volitional evolution’: altering the human genome in order to enter
a third phase of human development. However, to the extent that Houellebecq does
oﬀer a solution to the problems of life under neoliberal materialism, it involves not the
liberation of humanity, but the creation of distinct species, and humanity’s elimination.
This refuses the contradictory humanist posthumanism of thinkers such as Kurzweil and
Wilson, who reify ‘humanity’ while simultaneously proposing a utopian vision that goes
beyond it. Either we must accept the existence of a posthuman future is made possible
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by the extinction of the human species or, we must replace the reiﬁed conception of
‘being human’ on which such technocratic posthuman utopianism depends with a more
capacious and radical transvaluation of humanity as such, which amounts ultimately to
the same thing. In both Particules and these posthumanist visions of emancipation,
capitalism is understood as co-extensive with the human species, so that that the self-
destructive conception of human emancipation they advance appears not as
a contingent symptom of the system it seeks to exceed but as an essential and
inevitable truth. Echoing Jameson’s now famous apothegm on the end of capitalism
and the end of the world, Wilson and Kurzweil’s solution to misery under capitalism
proposes in disavowed form that the end of human suﬀering necessarily entails the end
of the human both biologically and conceptually. By contrast, Houellebecq’s Particules is
both explicit and sanguine about this possibility.
Perhaps then, if Particules does not provide more than a vision of our own complicity
in our materialist misery and the deﬂation of utopian desire, we can read it as a satire of
human barbarism and hubris of techno-scientiﬁc optimism. Perhaps Houellebecq parrots
and stages the language and cultural forms of society’s vulgar Darwinian imaginary to
mock that language and those forms as well as its own complicity in them. Yet this kind
of resistance, Crowley points out, is bathetic, ‘humiliated, feeble, derisory’, a symptom of
a world addressing itself in a language that cannot even muster the ‘energy to signal
itself as parodic’. The temporally and materially dislodged narrative perspective of the
clone in this work, then, does not oﬀer critical, parodic, or philosophical distance from
the tawdry materialism of late capitalist human society, but merely deepens the suspi-
cion that either this distance is founded on an illusion or that the very possibility of such
a distance would cost us our extinction.
Possibilité oﬀers a more nuanced but potentially just as deﬂationary perspective on
the emancipatory possibilities of Darwinian and neoliberal materialism. In contrast with
Particules, the narrative perspective of neohuman futurity on late capitalist savagery is
not provided by an exogenous narrative frame. Instead, the autobiographical narrative
of Daniel1 is penetrated by those of Daniel24 and Daniel25, which are themselves
comprised of exegetical commentary on the life story of their predecessor. This formal
entanglement indicates a more complex understanding of the relation between the
ages of materialism and post-materialist positivity. Unlike the posthuman world, neo-
humanity in Possibilité is not ﬁgured as a pure negation of its antecedent historical stage.
Rather, traces of the old persist in the new, undermining by deﬁnition the post-historical
and post-materialist age of neohumanity.
Each neohuman lives in an individual architecturally sealed enclave, surrounded by
a world overcome by environmental collapse. These cell-like structures, architectural
projections of neohuman autonomy, protect the neohuman from both the harsh exter-
ior climate as well as the roving tribes of non-cloned, savage humans that still live
scattered amongst the ruins of twenty-ﬁrst-century civilisation. Contact with other
members of the neohuman population is conducted via the exchange of digital code;
otherwise their days are constituted by peaceful contemplation and their exegetical
work on the life stories of previous generations—the intention of which is to extend
individual human consciousness, or soul, indeﬁnitely until the advent of post-physical
noetic singularity. Such an existence is a self-deluding one; the neohuman is neither
physically autarchic nor reproductively autopoietic. Reproduction is no longer
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connected to human sexual desire or relation, but has become an industrial relation,
conducted between the clone and a centralised cloning centre, revealing the neohu-
man’s immortality to be contingent. Neohumans do not ingest food, but still relies on
the atmosphere for nutritive sustenance. They are not, therefore, as Daniel24 puts it, ‘[r]
efermant la parenthèse du devenir’ [‘closing brackets on becoming’], but have merely
repressed the fact of their becoming in a form that is nominally diﬀerent to that of
‘natural selection’ and neoliberal social reproduction. The neohuman desire for noetic
unity is similarly problematic. What are the individual neohuman cells if not spatial,
temporal projections and intensiﬁcations of the atomised individualism of twenty-ﬁrst-
century life, from which they seek to escape? The novel concludes with Daniel25
departing his self-imposed evolutionary and social isolation, driven by a desire to re-
join the world of mortals. His isolation, he says, the condition of his biological transcen-
dence, has become intolerable. He desires nothing other than the intense, masochistic
pleasure of being human, which he recognises through his reading of Daniel1’s life story.
The interpenetration of human and neohuman existence, enacted by the novel’s formal
rhetoric, preﬁgures the manner in which traces of the old irrational materialism continue
to haunt, to shape, and ultimately to destroy human self-transcendence.
This is the death-blow for the notion of a ﬁnal, positive, or posthuman utopian stage
made possible by evolutionary genomic technology. It is ‘becoming’ in its evolutionary
and genomic forms, and its intensiﬁcation under late capitalism, which makes immor-
tality both desirable and materially possible. But it is the indeterminate historicity of
evolutionary change, its failure to eliminate contingency, that undermines humanity’s
indeﬁnite existence as well as the notion of its perfection. This is a kind of return of what
is repressed by both neoliberal or late capitalism in its fusion with Neo-Darwinian and
genomic science; if, ironically, our current evolutionary biopolitical conjuncture is
deﬁned by its ignorance of its own history, in this novel it is the impossible desire for
evolution to transcend itself, for a repetition of the same to provide a state of exception,
that undoes the very notion of transcendence from within.
Does Houellebecq in these two novels oﬀer us anything more than a complex but
ultimately pathetic reﬂection on the twenty-ﬁrst-century biopolitical hegemony of neoliberal
capitalism and the emancipatory possibilities of genomics? Like Zola’s Naturalism,
Houellebecq’s Neo-Naturalism succeeds in bearing witness to atavistic barbarism, staging
and (re-)enacting the manner in which human cruelty is determined and intensiﬁed by the
popularity and eventual universality of certain reductive, essentialist conceptions of human
nature in evolutionarydiscourse. Particulesoﬀers a savage indictmentof contemporary society,
as well as a critique of the utopian perspective from which this indictment is articulated—a
repudiation of its very possibility. Possibilité tells a similar story, emphasising the emptiness and
violence of twenty-ﬁrst-century life, while at the same time suggesting that evolutionary
transcendence is not only impossible, but would nevertheless be undesirable in its synthetic
form, just as our own late capitalist atomisation is intolerable today. If these novels attack the
essentialism and evolutionary determinism of posthumanist and transhumanist visions of the
future, they also seek to repudiate the optimism that deﬁnes both these and more critically
sophisticated and anti-essentialist images of posthuman emancipation. For Donna Harraway,
in her ‘Cyborg Manifesto’, the advent of new communications and biological technologies at
the close of the twentieth-century promised a new, malleable architecture of social relations
with which to re-form and challenge the biological and patriarchal myths of ‘organic
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wholeness’ as well as means for the production of a new revolutionary subject (Harraway
1991). Houellebecq’s post-gender, post-reproductive neohumans, however,merely reproduce
and intensify the conditions of isolation and alienation that deﬁne late capitalist materialism,
while refounding a new myth of transcendent wholeness in the form of technological
singularity. Harraway’s essay is cognisant of the contradictions arising from a response to
domination that arises out of those same conditions: ‘cyborgs [. . .] are the illegitimate oﬀspring
of militarism and patriarchal capitalism’ (1991, 150). But where Harraway hopes for cyborgs
that are disloyal to their origins, Houellebecq’s neohumans seem more faithful than ever
before to the individualism, anthropocentrism, and the buried faith in transcendence that
forms the substrate of late capitalist as well as some socialist ideologies. Above all, however,
the impression one gets fromHouellebecq’s clones is that posthumanity is fundamentally and
intolerably boring, amore fully realised iteration of the anhedonia thatHoullebecq’swork both
channels and denounces.
Houellebecq’s failed clones, then, are not solutions to the desperation caused by the twenty-
ﬁrst century’s epistemological and material self-imprisonment, but totems of an anti-solution.
They are in their irreducible ambivalence an aﬃrmatively aporetic response to a crisis that
seeks at all costs, throughbiological reduction andhistorical determinism, throughan iron grip
on the horizons of our political imagination, to eliminate uncertainty in all its forms. Pitiless
negativity should be seen as a positive achievement of Houellebecq’s literary work: its refusal,
however pathetic, of both the deterministic utopianism of the Comtean posthumanism,
genomics, and Neo-Darwinian thought as well as of the nihilism to which it oﬀers a solution,
which is similarly deterministic in its insistence on humanity’s inalterable savagery. The end of
humanity, whether through self-transcendence or self-destruction, is not pre-determinable.
Aporia aﬃrms what lies beyond the realism of capitalism and ‘the survival of the ﬁttest’—
futurity.
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